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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Williams appealed contending the district court abused its discretion by not ordering
a psychological evaluation at his request during the change of plea hearing and by subsequently
imposing an excessive sentence without sufficiently considering the mitigating factors, including
his mental health issues.
The State has not challenged Mr. Williams argument about the psychological evaluation
on the merits. Rather, it only makes a series of procedural arguments that amount to an assertion
that Mr. Williams' request "for a mental health eval[uation]" was not sufficient to preserve his
argument that the district court erred by not ordering a mental health evaluation under I.C. § 192522 for appeal. This Court should reject those arguments because they are contrary to, and in
some cases, misrepresent, the applicable legal standards.

The State's arguments on the

sentencing issue are not remarkable and require no further reply. As such, this Court should
remand this case for further proceedings after a psychological evaluation is conducted.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Williams's Appellant's Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by not ordering a psychological evaluation
at Mr. Williams' request.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence on
Mr. Williams without sufficiently considering all the mitigating information.

2

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Ordering A Psychological Evaluation Pursuant
At Mr. Williams' Request
The State has not contested the merits of Mr. Williams' arguments on this issue. Rather,
it has simply tried to argue that this issue was not properly raised in this appeal. (See generally
Resp. Br., pp.7-11.) As such, if this Court determines that this issue is properly raised on appeal,
the State has effectively conceded that this case should be remanded for a new sentencing
hearing after a psychological evaluation is conducted.
This Court should reach the merits of this issue because the State's procedural arguments
- which essentially amount to an argument that Mr. Williams' request for a "mental health
eval[uation]" was not sufficient to preserve the issue that the district court erred by not ordering a
mental health evaluation for appeal - are contrary to, and in some cases, misrepresent, the
controlling precedent.

A.

Mr. Williams Specifically Requested The District Court Choose The Option Of Ordering
A Mental Health Evaluation By A Professional; As Such, He Did Not "Invite" Its
Alternative Decision To Use The Mental Health Screening Tool
The State's first procedural argument is that, because Mr. Williams' attorney noted that

there were two potential options available to the district court - order a psychological evaluation
or order the mental health screening tool - he "invited" the district court's choice to use the
screening tool. That argument overstates the invited error doctrine and actually misrepresents
the point Mr. Williams' attorney was making. First, Mr. Williams' attorney reiterated his request
for a "mental health eval[uation]" while acknowledging the two options. (Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.11,
L.1.) As such, his point was that, while he might defer to the district court's discretion in that
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regard, his client was specifically requesting it choose the evaluation option. (See Tr., p.10, L.21
- p.11, L.1.) To that point, Mr. Williams subsequently reiterated his request for a professional to
evaluate him and determine the best course of treatment for the issues he was experiencing.
(Tr., p.11, L.7 - p.12, L.3.)
That Mr. Williams and his attorney continued to ask the district court to choose the
option of ordering the "mental health eval[uation]" rather than the screening tool is critical in the
context of invited error because the invited error doctrine only precludes a challenge where the
party has actually "encouraged" or "prompted" the district court to make the choice of option it
ultimately did.
DICTIONARY,

Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 833 (2010) (quoting BLACK'S LAW

249 (3rd pocket ed. 2006) ("'Invited error' is '[a]n error that a party cannot

complain of on appeal because the party, through conduct, encouraged or prompted the trial
court to make the erroneous ruling."'). As the Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffirmed: "'The
doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when [the party's] own
conduct induces the commission of the error"' because "'The purpose of the invited error
doctrine is to prevent a party who caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court
to [take certain action] from later challenging that [action] on appeal."' City of Middleton v.
Coleman Homes, LLC, 163 Idaho 716, 727 (2018) (quoting Thompson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99,

106 (2009), and Taylor, 149 Idaho at 834, respectively) (emphasis added, brackets from
original). Therefore, for example, the doctrine of invited error did not prevent a defendant from
raising an issue on appeal regarding the jury instruction about malice even though he had not
objected below because "he did not encourage the district court to offer the specific malice
instructions given." State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 477 (2010).
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In this case, despite acknowledging the screening tool was an option, Mr. Williams did
not encourage, prompt, or induce the district court to actually choose to use that option. Rather,
he consistently asked it to select the other option and order a "mental health eval[uation]" by a
professional. 1 (R., pp.37-38; Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.12, L.3.) In fact, the district court's decision on
this issue demonstrates that it recognized he was asking for a full evaluation under I.C. § 192522: "Well, and for sure when I see this, I will definitely ask for a mental health evaluation as
part of the presentence process. I'm just not convinced at this point because I don't have enough
information what more we might need so that will depend on some things that develop later."2
(Tr., p.12, Ls.4-10.) Since Mr. Williams did not encourage the district court to choose the
screening tool option, the invited error doctrine does not apply in this case. See State v. Edghill,
155 Idaho 846, 849-50 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding the invited error doctrine did not prevent an
argument on appeal where the defendant requested relief and the district court granted a form of
relief because if "the specific relief [the defendant] sought is not what was granted by the district

1

The fact that Mr. Williams asked for an evaluation by a professional is important because it
reaffirms that he was asking the district court to order a full evaluation rather than the screening
tool. Section 19-2524 only talks about a professional getting involved after the screening tool
has been used, when the screening tool reveals there are potential mental health issues which a
more in-depth evaluation is needed to properly evaluate. See I.C. § 19-2524(3). More
importantly, if that more in-depth evaluation does not meet the requirements set forth in
LC. § 19-2522, the district court will still be required to order another evaluation pursuant to
Section 19-2522, which expressly requires the evaluation be conducted by a professional
(a "psychiatrist or licensed psychologist"). I.C. § 19-2522(1), (6) (explaining that the court
"need not order an additional examination" under I.C. § 19-2522 if it determines a more in-depth
evaluation conducted under I.C. § 19-2524 contains all the "necessary information required in
subsection (3) of this section.")
2
By its plain language, LC. § 19-2522 only comes into play when there is information giving
rise to the reasonable belief that the defendant's mental health will be a significant issue at
sentencing. I.C. § 19-2522(1). The screening tool, on the other hand, is required in all cases
where there is a felony conviction regardless of information about mental health issues.
I.C. § 19-2524(1)(b). Therefore, the fact that the district court's decision was based on the lack of
sufficient information demonstrates it was rejecting a request for an evaluation under I.C. § 192522.
5

court," the defendant had not encouraged that particular decision); cf. State v. Gonzalez, 165
Idaho 95, _ , 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019) (reiterating that an issue is properly preserved and
presented on appeal when "both the issue and the party's position on the issue" were raised
before the lower court) ( emphasis added).
The State's argument under Beesley v. Beesley, 114 Idaho 536 (1988), crumbles in light
of this proper understanding of the invited error doctrine. (Resp. Br., p.8.) In Beesley, the
divorcing parties introduced evidence of the valuation of certain assets as of the date of their
separation and the date of their formal divorce. Beesley, 114 Idaho at 538. The complaining
party then specifically told the trial court that "We said we didn't care which ever one you [the
court] used." Id. In other words, his argument prompted the district court to use either date. See
id. As such, he could not complain about the court's decision to use the date of divorce. Id. The

State's argument conspicuously ignores this critical fact in the Beesley decision, and thereby,
misrepresented the nature of that decision.

(See generally Resp. Br.)

Unlike the party in

Beesley, who argued it did not matter which option the court selected, Mr. Williams specifically

and repeatedly asked the district court to select one particular option from those available to it.
(R., pp.37-38; Tr., p.10, L.21 - p. 12, L.3.) As such, he did not, like the party in Beesley,
encourage or promote the district court's particular decision to select the other option.
The State's reliance on Thomson v. Olsen is similarly flawed. (See Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) In
Thompson, the Supreme Court held the defendant could not challenge the introduction of certain

evidence because he "opened the door for Respondent to offer [that] evidence." Thompson, 147
Idaho at 106. As in Beesley, the issue was not that there were multiple choices the district court
could make, but rather, that the complaining had actually prompted the district court to make the
decision at issue. See Thomson, 147 Idaho at 106-07 ("Under the doctrine of invited error,
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Appellant's argument fails because he invited the court to admit the consent form evidence when
he testified that Dr. Olsen did not discuss the risks of surgery with him."). The flaw in the
State's reasoning is actually demonstrated by the fact that it cites the portion of Thomson quoting
State v. Caudill, l 09 Idaho 222, 226 (1985), but ignores the very next sentence: '"The doctrine

of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his own conduct induces the
commission of the error."' Thomson, 147 Idaho at 106 (quoting State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho
816, 819 (Ct. App. 1993)) (emphasis added). As discussed supra, while Mr. Williams' attorney
mentioned the option of the screening tool, Mr. Williams did not induce or encourage the district
court to actually use that option; rather, he continuously requested it use the other option and
order a "mental health eval[uation]" by a professional.
As such, a proper understanding of the invited error doctrine reveals that, smce
Mr. Williams did not encourage, prompt, or otherwise induce the district court to actually choose
the screening tool option, the doctrine of invited error is inapplicable in this case, and his
challenge to that decision is properly presented on appeal.

B.

Mr. Williams Did Not Need To Object To The District Court's Ruling On His Request
For A Mental Health Evaluation In Order To Preserve That Issue For Appeal
The State's second procedural argument - that Mr. Williams had to object after the

district court decided to order only a mental health screening in order to preserve this issue for
appeal (Resp. Br., p.9) - ignores several of the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decisions which
make it clear that, to preserve an issue for appeal, the party only needs to raise the issue and his
position on that issue in the lower court. State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, _ , 443 P.3d 231,
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237-39 (2019) (tracing the Supreme Court's recent precedent in this regard)). 3 There is no
requirement that a party object when the district court is rejecting his position on an issue in
order to preserve that issue for appeal - the district court's adverse decision is sufficient.
See, e.g., State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 868 (2019) (reaffirming that, where the district court

actually rules on an issue, even if the party did not expressly argue it, that decision may be
challenged for the first time on appeal); Godwin, 164 Idaho at 914 ("[T]he bedrock of Godwin's
appellate argument is present in the record and the district court made a determination on the
issue of custody [during the interrogation]. Accordingly, Godwin properly presents this issue on
appeal.").
Mr. Williams raised this issue and made his position on it known by specifically
requesting a "mental health eval[uation]" by a professional. (R., pp.37-38; Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.12,
L.3; see also Tr., p.12, Ls.4-10 (as discussed in Section I(A), supra, the district court's decision
demonstrating that it understood Mr. Williams to be requesting an evaluation under LC. § 192522).) As such, the propriety of the district court's decision to reject Mr. Williams' request is
properly preserved for appeal.
This also means that the State's attempt to compare this case to State v. Carter, 155 Idaho
170 (2013), is baseless. (See Resp. Br., p.10.) In Carter, the question was whether the district
court had a duty to order a psychological evaluation sua sponte - i.e., whether it had to order on
its own motion without a request from the defendant.
3

Carter, 155 Idaho at 172-73. Since

See generally Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95; State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585 (2018); State v. Cohagan,
162 Idaho 717 (2017), reh 'g denied; State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271 (2017); Ada
County Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138 (2017); see also State v. Gonzales,
165 Idaho 667, _ , 450 P.3d 315, 320-21 (2019); State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, _ , 448
P.3d 1005, 1011-12 (2019); State v. Wolfe, 165 Idaho 338, _ , 445 P.3d 147, 150-51 (2019);
State v. Godwin, 164 Idaho 903, 913-14 (2019), State v. Islas, 165 Idaho 260, _ , 443 P.3d 274,
279-83 & n.1 (Ct. App. 2019) (criticizing the State for failing to discuss these cases in its brief),
rev. denied.
8

Mr. Williams actually made a request for a psychological evaluation below, Carter is simply not
applicable to this case.
Since this issue is properly raised on appeal, and since the State has not contested the
merits of this issue, this Court should remand this case for new sentencing after a psychological
evaluation is conducted for the reasons discussed in the Appellant's Brief

(See App.

Br., pp.7-10.)

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence On Mr. Williams
Without Sufficiently Considering All The Mitigating Information
The State's responses concerning the excessiveness of Mr. Williams' sentence are not
remarkable, and as such, no further reply is necessary in regard to those issues. Accordingly,
Mr. Williams simply refers the Court back to pages 10-16 ofhis Appellant's Brief

CONCLUSION
Mr. Williams respectfully requests this Court vacate his sentence and remand this case
for new sentencing after such a psychological evaluation is conducted. Alternatively, he requests
this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 30th day of December, 2019.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of December, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

BRD/eas
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